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OPINION OF THE COURT
                    
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge.
This matter comes on before this court on the appeal of plaintiff Adam Brown,
d/b/a Iliad Antik, from an order entered in the district court on April 29, 2004, dismissing
this action.  We first set forth the unusual procedural and factual history of this case.
Brown initiated this diversity of citizenship action governed by Pennsylvania law
against Zurich-American Insurance Company seeking to recover under a policy Zurich
wrote covering property damage losses, alleging that on or about August 12, 2002, he had
suffered flood damage to Biedermeier furniture that he had acquired and that was in a
facility in Prague, in the Czech Republic, at the time of the flood.  Brown had acquired
the furniture from its owners in and around Prague with the intent of importing it into the
United States and to sell it in a restored condition.  While there is no question that Zurich
wrote the policy and that it was in effect at the time of the loss and, in some
3circumstances, would have covered his loss, when Brown made his claim Zurich denied
coverage.  Zurich denied the claim because while the policy provided that its “territorial
limits” were “anywhere in the World,” it further provided that the territorial limits of the
policy “exclud[ed] the former Iron Curtain countries,” and thus excluded the Czech
Republic.
Brown moved for summary judgment on the theory that at the time of the loss the
property had not been in a “former Iron Curtain” country as the Czech Republic did not
exist as a political entity until January 1, 1993, which was after the dissolution of the Iron
Curtain.  Thus, in Brown’s view, the property had not been in a former Iron Curtain
country during the time he owned it or at the time of the loss, and, accordingly, the
exclusion to the world-wide coverage area could not apply.  Of course, Zurich opposed
the motion.  Nevertheless, even though its argument, if accepted, i.e. that the Czech
Republic should be regarded as a former Iron Curtain country for purposes of Brown’s
policy, would have entitled it to a summary judgment, it did not file a cross-motion
seeking such a judgment.
The district court ruled on Brown’s motion by a memorandum and order dated
March 31, 2004.  After setting forth the factual history of the case and the criteria for
disposition of the motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c), the court continued with its
discussion, describing the history of the Iron Curtain and Brown’s argument.  The court
pointed out that during the time of the Iron Curtain the Czech Republic and Slovakia
4together constituted Czechoslovakia which undoubtedly had been an Iron Curtain
country.  It then concluded that a former Iron Curtain country “include[d] any political
state that was previously an Iron Curtain country, without regard for what form that
political state is in now.”  It continued that the Czech Republic “was not fashioned from
whole cloth, but derived from the divorce of the Czechs and the Slovaks that made up
Czechoslovakia [and thus] was previously or at a time in the past, Czechoslovakia, an
Iron Curtain country.”  Consequently, it concluded that whether “examined
geographically or grammatically, there is only one reasonable interpretation of the phrase
‘former Iron Curtain countries’” and that the Czech Republic is one such country. 
Therefore, it denied Brown’s motion for summary judgment.
The court’s disposition left the case in a peculiar posture.  Clearly, under its
opinion Zurich was entitled to a summary judgment though it had not sought one.  Thus,
notwithstanding the March 31, 2004 opinion and order the case would go on to its
inevitable demise.  Brown, of course, recognized that the court’s decision “had the
practical effect of granting [Zurich] summary judgment,” appellant’s br. at 3, and he
accordingly filed a motion to convert the order of March 31, 2004, into a final order so
that the case would be over and he could appeal.  The district court on April 29, 2004,
granted Brown’s motion and in its order “summarily dismissed [the complaint] for the
reasons stated in the Memorandum and Order of March 31, 2004.”  This order, in effect,
granted Zurich a summary judgment on the merits.  Brown then appealed from the order
5of April 29, 2004.
Ordinarily we would not have jurisdiction over an appeal from an order denying
summary judgment.  That principle, however, is inapplicable here as Brown appeals from
an order effectively granting summary judgment against him.  Furthermore, usually a
party cannot appeal from an order it sought.  Here, however, it is clear that Brown sought
the order of April 29, 2004, only as a logical corollary to the order of March 31, 2004. 
Certainly, Brown did not bring this action in the hope it would be dismissed.  Rather, he
wanted to recover a judgment against Zurich.  Finally, we are not barred from
entertaining this appeal on the theory that some aspect of the case remains open in the
district court or that the case was dismissed without prejudice.  To the contrary, the case
was resolved completely in the district court and, inasmuch as the dismissal was on the
merits, Brown cannot reinstitute it without being barred by principles of claim preclusion. 
Thus, we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
On this appeal we exercise plenary review.  See USX Corp. v. Adriatic Ins. Co.,
345 F.3d 190, 199 (3d Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 903 (2004).  Therefore, we use
the same standard as the district court did in originally granting summary judgment and
can affirm only “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to the interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact and [Zurich] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(c).
6After our review of this matter, we have concluded that the policy is not
ambiguous with respect to its application to Brown’s property.  The territorial limitation
provision does not relate to political entities.  Thus, it is not captioned, e.g., “Political
Entity Limits.”  Rather, it is captioned “Territorial Limits,” i.e., therefore relating to land
mass.  Accordingly, the reference to Iron Curtain countries was for the purpose of
defining areas.  Therefore, inasmuch as Prague undoubtedly was behind the Iron Curtain,
the exclusion applies.
We realize, as Brown points out, that there possibly could be a different result in
cases involving losses at locations within the former German Democratic Republic (East
Germany), which was an Iron Curtain country.  To reunify Germany, the former East
Germany became a part of the Federal Republic of Germany (formerly West Germany),
an entity that never was an Iron Curtain country.  But the Czech Republic is different
from the Federal Republic of Germany, as it did not in political terms exist before the
dissolution of the Iron Curtain.  Moreover, the Czech Republic and Slovakia are the
successors to Czechoslovakia which undoubtedly was behind the Iron Curtain. 
Consequently, Prague and the entire Czech Republic, unlike the German Democratic
Republic, did not become part of a country that never was behind the Iron Curtain. 
Therefore, the Federal Republic of Germany is not, unlike the Czech Republic, a
replacement of an Iron Curtain country.
In reaching our result we also point out that if the loss here had been prior to
7January 1, 1993, there clearly could not have been a recovery on the policy had it been in
effect at that time.  After all, everyone agrees that before that date the property was in an
Iron Curtain country.  It is difficult to understand why the result should be any different
for a loss on or after that date merely because Czechoslovakia was partioned at that time,
as we see no reason to believe that the partioning somehow could have lessened the risk
that Zurich was taking.  In any event, Brown does not contend that the political
dissolution of Czechoslovakia decreased the risk to property in Prague from the risk to it
immediately prior to the partion.
In reaching our result we have not overlooked Brown’s argument that the district
court’s decision (and thus by extension our opinion) achieves “a result that is respectfully
called absurd.”  Appellant’s br. at 24.  He makes this statement because he correctly
points out that the exclusion does not apply in countries that never were behind the Iron
Curtain but in which, in his view, “chaos has replaced the rule of law.”  Id. 
He supports his argument with the principle that “the proper interpretation of a
contract ‘is the one which appears to be in accord with justice and common sense and the
probable intention of the parties,’” quoting Keating v. Stadium Mgmt. Corp. 508 N.E.2d
121, 124-25 (Mass. App. Ct. 1987).  Appellant’s br. at 24.  But this principle does not
allow us to rewrite the policy.  Thus, we cannot delete the Territorial Limits provision
from the policy or delete the Iron Curtain exclusion from the provision.  Moreover, we
cannot borrow principles of under inclusion from First Amendment constitutional law and
8apply them in a contract law setting so as to eliminate the Iron Curtain exclusion.  Thus,
while we agree that risk to property is probably far greater in certain areas of the world
that never were behind the Iron Curtain than the risk in Prague, which we know has
redeveloped into a magnificent city, still we cannot eliminate the Iron Curtain exclusion
on the grounds that it is foolish for Zurich to include it in its policies.  
Furthermore, it is difficult for Brown to argue cogently that the “probable intention
of the parties” was to provide for coverage here.  After all, Brown obtained the policy on
or about December 26, 2000, for a one-year term (it was renewed in December 2001) and
did not lease his facility in Prague until January 2002.  Moreover, he testified at his
disposition that while he “reviewed the policy” when he obtained it he was not aware of
the Territorial Limits provision and did not become so “until after [he] had the losses” in
the flood.  App. at 47.  It is unfortunate that when Brown leased his Prague facility he did
not review his insurance for if he had read the Territorial Limits provision it surely would
have alerted him to his potential insurance coverage problem. 
The order of April 29, 2004, will be affirmed.
